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Abstract
We propose a novel architecture for federated learning within healthcare consortia.
At the heart of the solution is a unique integration of privacy preserving technolo-
gies, built upon native enterprise blockchain components available in the Ethereum
ecosystem. We show how the specific characteristics and challenges of healthcare
consortia informed our design choices, notably the conception of a new Secure
Aggregation protocol assembled with a protected hardware component and an
encryption toolkit native to Ethereum. Our architecture also brings in a privacy
preserving audit trail that logs events in the network without revealing identities.
1 Privacy in healthcare and Federated Learning Consortia
The healthcare sector is uniquely positioned to leverage data for the purpose of creating value and
improving human health. However, our ability to learn from health data is in tension with a unique set
of ethical, legal, economic and technical challenges related to data privacy. But traditional methods
of mitigating health data privacy concerns, namely HIPAA and the use of deidentified data, have
proven insufficient to protect individuals’ interests. Realizing data’s promise will require new tools,
and we propose a novel federated learning architecture that is uniquely suited to these problems.
Large scale federated learning as depicted in the original series of papers Bonawitz et al. [2017, 2019]
involves a great number of mobile devices that take part in the training rounds. This introduces a
series of design constraints and challenges to enable learning to happen on these resource-limited
devices without disrupting the end-user’s experience nor privacy. We argue that among the challenges
highlighted in Bonawitz et al. [2019], some elements are not relevant anymore when considering a
consortium context.
The most significant change lies in the data distribution. A consortium will contain less parties than a
public network of mobile devices, but each of these participants will host a larger quantity of data.
They will also benefit from substantially more compute and storage resources, as the devices involved
in the training rounds will be server-grade machines rather than smartphones. Another discrepancy
exposed by servers is that they can be leveraged in a training round at any time of the day (contrary
to mobile devices which will be leveraged mostly when charging and connected to a home Wi-Fi
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Figure 1: Global overview of a training round
network). Network connectivity will also be more reliable, thus almost no participant will drop out
during a training round.
These elements informed our design choices, which as a result differ from the blueprints established
in Bonawitz et al. [2019], Lalitha et al. [2018]. The architecture we introduce in this paper draws its
specificity and novelty from the combination of four main features making it particularly suitable for
the healthcare consortia settings we are considering: 1) Data owners can define fine-grained access
policy to their data, restricting access to certain members of the consortium only (Section 2.2), 2) An
alternative implementation of Secure Aggregation based on AMD SEV in memory encryption, which
introduces a trusted third-party more suitable than a potentially brittle Multi-Party Computation
(MPC) with a limited number of non-anonymous participants (Section 2.3), 3) Peer-to-peer transit
encryption of updated weights between the workers and the Secure Aggregator leveraging cutting
edge Ethereum technology Alabi [2018] (Section 2.4), 4) A privacy preserving audit trail logs actions
undertaken within the network while keeping the actual list of participants to a training round hidden
(Section 3.2).
2 System architecture
Figure 1 gives an overview of the system architecture and and of a training round. All the parties in
the network have access to their own Ethereum account that will identify them and enable them to
interact with the rest of the network. Our solution exploits the Federated Learning building bricks
provided by the PySyft library Ryffel et al. [2018].
2.1 Overview
The Model Owner (MO) initiates the process by uploading his model to a distributed storage
infrastructure (IPFS, Swarm, . . . ) available to all the members of the consortium. MO then registers
the model and a training description to an Orchestrator smart contract. This description will contain
similar information to what a FL Plan does in Bonawitz et al. [2019].
The Orchestrator is embodied by one or potentially several smart contracts. In addition to storing the
models, it maintains a list of Data Workers (DW). A DW is a node in the network that possesses one
or many datasets that can be of interest for MOs to improve their models. DWs are communicating
by instantiating a web socket server as available in PySyft. DWs have the ability to specify a blacklist
of model owners that shouldn’t have access to some or all of their data. They do so by updating a
mapping of Ethereum addresses (representing the blacklisted MOs) and dataset identifiers stored in
the Orchestrator smart contract.
In order to initiate a training round, the Orchestrator first determines the full set of data workers
that comply with the previous exclusion rules (a post training selection will further reduce the set
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as described in 3.1). The Orchestrator schedules a training task for the selected workers using
private transactions. All the actions undertaken by the Orchestrator are logged on chain in a privacy
preserving fashion as described in Section 3.2. Each selected worker now pulls the latest checkpoint
of the model from the shared distributed storage. The worker performs a training step as defined in
the corresponding training description stored in the Orchestrator. Once it has completed its training
round, the worker encrypts the newly obtained set of weights for the Secure Aggregator (SA).
SA is a special entity, a Virtual Machine or container, whose memory is encrypted from its host using
the AMD SEV technology (Section 2.3). The Aggregator fetches all the encrypted weights from the
decentralised storage, decrypts them within the safe realm of its encrypted memory and performs
the aggregation. It finally uploads the new model checkpoint to the shared storage and updates the
Orchestrator smart contract with new pointer. Multiple SA could be instantiated to accommodate a
larger workload or introduce more decentralisation and reliability.
2.2 Role of Ethereum and Fine grained data permissioning
In the context of federated learning consortia, it is critical to prevent legal, ethical, and competitive
requirements from being compromised. We argue in this paper that the Ethereum Wood and others
[2014] blockchain can fulfill such a role and benefit an architecture targeting consortia in the
healthcare industry in particular. The combination of a decentralised immutable ledger that can be
updated programmatically in a highly trustable flavour makes Ethereum a very appealing choice to
design modern decentralised and secure systems. Hyperledger Besu is an enterprise-grade Ethereum
client. These tools enable consortia to implement cooperative standards for viewing, transacting,
and communicating within in the network. For example, providing read-only access of an audit
trail to an external third-party or restricting data exchange to a subset of network nodes for private
communication.
On top of Besu’s native features, an Orchestrator smart contract controls the traffic in the network,
keeping track of permissions set by each user regarding the level of data-sharing access with other
members in the consortium. In addition to governing activity and authorizations, smart contracts
can also support the exchange of native tokens within the Ethereum blockchain. Tokens have been
proposed as a way of incentivizing network participants to perform actions; in our architecture they
could be used to incentivize computations. However, they extend naturally as a fungible or non-
fungible measure of value in an information exchange, and can serve as the backbone for incentivized
data-sharing in a federated learning consortia. In our use case, smart contract(s) can record metrics
throughout federated learning lifecycles, and specify the execution of remuneration policies chosen
by the consortia.
2.3 AMD SEV based Secure Aggregator
Architectures like Bonawitz et al. [2019] are designed for training rounds involving “a few hundred
devices”. Within the context of healthcare, federated learning consortia are mostly likely to be adopted
by enterprises first. This will limit the number of members in a network, likely to be under 100. This
number will shrink even more when applying the data selection filters and account permissioning
rules.
While medical applications have been shown to successfully leverage federated learning with a lower
number of workers (20-30) Roy et al. [2019], Sheller et al. [2019] compared to Bonawitz et al. [2019],
this could break the security properties of the Secure Aggregation scheme presented in Bonawitz
et al. [2017]. Secure Aggregation Bonawitz et al. [2019] is performed via a MPC protocol built on
top of Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme Shamir [1979]. In our present context, the number of
active devices would be too low to provide the same level of guarantees for the MPC. On top of that,
members of a consortium are highly likely to know each other and this would dramatically increase
the risks of compromising the security threshold of the SSS scheme.
We introduce a better suited approach for such consortia based on protected hardware such as AMD’s
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) memory encryption technology and Intel’s Software Guard
Extensions (SGX). Mofrad et al. [2018] provides a concise comparison of these technologies, each of
which generally cryptographically isolate software containers from the host system to better protect
confidential data.
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Secure Aggregation as described in Bonawitz et al. [2017] is secure in the honest but curious context.
That is, if an attacker gains access to a participant in the MPC, he will only find secret shares from
which he will not be able to reconstruct the private data. Here, SEV provides equivalent guarantees
of in-memory privacy from attackers outside the VM/container it protects. As a result, we implement
a Secure Aggregator as a trusted third party running inside an AMD SEV protected VM. At the
end of a training round, workers communicate their encrypted computed weights to the Secure
Aggregator who performs the aggregation then uploads a non-encrypted updated model back to the
shared storage.
2.4 Peer-to-peer in transit encryption of updated weights
Weight encryption while in transit between worker and aggregator is however extremely important
since it contains the private data used for this training step that should remain private to the worker.
We assume here that the members of the consortium will adopt honest but curious behaviour, and
would have a strong incentive to eavesdrop on the network to learn of the raw updates shared by other
members containing valuable information on their private datasets.
At the time of writing, encryption over the wire is not available to protect the traffic between two
workers in PySyft. While this feature is under active development, our system will leverage Ethereum
Improvement Proposal (EIP) 1024 Alabi [2018] that offers peer-to-peer transit encryption of arbitrary
data between two Ethereum accounts. Using EIP-1024, we can encrypt the new weights calculated
by each worker before they are being sent back to the Secure Aggregator.
3 Security requirements
Secure aggregation brings a first level of privacy by hiding the raw updates to a model from a
given data owner. However, the identity of the data owners who took part in a training round could
allow an attacker to extract meaningful information from the aggregated weights. We describe two
counter-measure to this issue in this section.
3.1 Random selection of contributions to aggregate
For a given federated training round, all chosen workers will compute gradient updates, but the
Secure Aggregator will randomly select a subset of weights for aggregation. After each training
round, the Secure Aggregator will forget the unpicked weight updates and the workers will not be
notified whether or not their updated weights were selected for aggregation.
In the most critical case, a malicious worker or a cartel of workers could communicate their weight
updates for a given training round via a third-party channel. This would allow the model owner to
reverse engineer a round update and extract the exact contribution of each worker as highlighted in
Melis et al. [2018]. By selecting updates for aggregation, such malicious intent to expose another
member’s data contribution can be prevented. Note that while this privacy preserving mechanism
is distinct from Differential Privacy (DP) Papernot et al. [2016], Abadi et al. [2016], they can be
combined to provide even more enhanced privacy guarantees.
3.2 Privacy preserving audit trail
As described in the global overview of the architecture, a residual benefit from our Ethereum-based
system is the immutable audit trail stored on chain. The audit trail gathers events related to the
learning process. As part of our privacy in depth proposal, we must not leak sensitive information
that may compromise the privacy guarantees of the federated learning process.
The Secure Aggregator (SA) will spearhead this non-identifiable update protocol. First, for each data
worker taking part in the round the SA will generate a new unique random nonce for the current round.
Each worker already has an established secure communication channel with SA given EIP 1024
transit encryption. Data between SA and a worker are encrypted using a symmetric Diffie-Helmann
(DH) secret derived from the worker’s public key and SA’s private key (or conversely). SA will apply
Ethereum’s keccak256 function to the concatenation of this shared DH secret and the nonce it just
generated, sending the resulting hash encrypted via EIP 1024 to the corresponding worker. The hash
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is published on chain and will serve as an anonymous identifier for the corresponding data worker
during a training round.
The only attack to uniquely identify a data worker in the audit trail is to know the DH secret that
has been concatenated to the random nonce. Thus, as long as the worker’s and SA’s respective
private keys remain private, they are the only two entities in the system able to reidentify the worker’s
corresponding entries in the audit trail.
4 Conclusion
This work introduced an architecture for federated learning in healthcare consortia built on the
Ethereum blockchain. The architecture leverages Ethereum and its ecosystem (e.g., EIP 1024 encryp-
tion and the Besu enterprise client) to provide a coherent design reflecting the specific challenges
in healthcare consortia. The novel architecture relies on a series of four "privacy in depth" blocks
that provide a unique combination of features: fine-grained data access policies, a new Secure
Aggregation agent running in hardware-protected processes, weight encryption via EIP 1024 and a
privacy preserving audit trail of the events in a training round.
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